There are fundamental differences between the European Union and Iran over its nuclear activities.
In order to confront Iran’s nuclear ambitions the EU must find alternatives to the current negotiations track. It is time to use a new track. What is most needed now is a creative diplomacy with a vision and new ideas as it is probable that there will be more leeway at the diplomatic level.
On 31st December 2011, Iran had proposed to restart negotiations about its nuclear programme. Earlier in December 2011, Iran has issued a new proposal to receive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) personnel in Teheran to discuss concerns and remove “ambiguities” about its disputed nuclear programme.
These invitations open a window of opportunity to restart the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. This opportunity is a serious test case for the EU’s unity and its security strategy. The EU needs to take a more active role in preparing the negotiations and adopt a more flexible approach and at the same time should learn from its previous negotiating experience with Iran.
The main problem today is that the negotiation process with Iran has been Americanised and at the same time we should be clear about the fact that the United States foreign policy towards Iran has reached a dead end.
Building confidence and engagement is not possible when the United States is in charge and the EU strictly complies with American policy. It is time that we realised that Europe and the United States do not share a common view of the world.
By following American policy the EU strengthens Iranian mistrust towards the EU and reduces its positive influence on Iran. By taking the leadership in engaging in the Iran crisis, the EU will prove its negotiating qualities and its ability to effectively negotiate a solution to this crisis through a coherent EU foreign policy.
The EU should broaden the pursuit of its diplomatic efforts with no preconditions on the table. It is time for Europe to lead and be at the centre of the negotiations, refocusing on the European soft-power strategy.
It is important that the EU acts openly, and convinces by its words and deeds, and must be able take necessary decisions and implement a unified strategy, otherwise it will lose its credibility and become irrelevant.
The diplomatic efforts must be made in the framework of basic values and principles as well as the moral standing of the EU.
Past efforts to reach an agreement failed because of the lack of mutual understanding and because of the unwillingness to do so. As the EU takes the lead it is time to consider the Russian proposal to restart the stalled negotiations. The Russian proposal calls for Iran to gradually address international concerns about its nuclear activities. In return economic penalties targeting Iran would, over time, be drawn-down.
Russia could use its influence over Iran in order to get the negotiations moving again. The Russian step-by-step approach is based on Iran being rewarded with easing of sanctions in exchange for more transparency over the state of its nuclear programme.
By following the Russian step-by-step approach the EU should avoid being entrapped more and more in the course of the negotiations through small step-by-step decisions that could result in the loss of manoeuvre possibilities.
Russia’s special relations with Teheran may be the only way to crack the deadlock which many believe to be past resolving.
Let’s keep in mind, that Russia is not considered by Iran as an enemy. Moscow is actively involved with Teheran in helping to develop its nuclear programme and this gives Russia a prominent role in dealing with Iran.
It is unlikely that the EU will be able to rally broad political support from Arab or Islamic countries for confronting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Developments in the Middle East today undercut the EU’s ultimate objective to pressure or persuade Iran to bargain away its nuclear programme.
Europe has to realise that it underestimated the staying power of the Iranian regime and that it lacks a coherent long-term strategy to deal with Iran’s nuclear programme.
The role of the EU is seen as fundamental in the process of confidence building and maintaining an open diplomatic channel that is helpful in understanding Iran’s intentions and motivation in order to pursue more pragmatic and effective engagement strategies.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Kremlin.ru)
The EU has to find the balance between Iran’s desire to establish a nuclear enrichment programme and the safeguards of the international community. A mutually acceptable solution regarding Iran’s nuclear aspirations as well as red-lines can be found regarding sensitive issues as suspension, timeframe, the level of activities and enrichment could lead to a positive outcome of the negotiations, as the EU is seen by Iran in a more positive light than other states.
Europe should not enter the negotiations without a clear strategy or alternative and the EU has to take into consideration an Iranian decision-making process that is a very complex issue.
The Iranian negotiation style, as known until now, is the tendency to win every round in the negotiations and then renegotiate the agreement so that it fits Teheran’s preferences. It should be made clear from the beginning that there will be no re-negotiations.
Possible concessions by the Iranians will especially depend on the possibility of not loosing face and continue negotiating. The European Union should avoid talks restricted only to the nuclear issue and devise a broader strategy towards Iran by addressing non-nuclear outstanding issues that can achieve the Iranian government support and cooperation as well as energy and security in the region.
The EU demands touch on Iran’s vital interests and on questions of prestige, regional aspirations and nationalism.
Iran’s demand to exercise the right to enrich uranium on its own territory is based on article IV of the Treaty of the non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which states: “Nothing in this Treaty shell be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.”
Having a nuclear weapon capability is forbidden by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and possessing an enrichment capability is far from being tantamount to possessing nuclear weapons.
The accumulation of enriched uranium does not mean that the Iranians intend or are anywhere close to having a nuclear weapon. It looks more that Iran wants to gain ‘nuclear threshold’ (or nuclear latency) status and there are good geopolitical reasons for doing so, comparable to that of other countries, and expects that this achievement by itself will increase its political standing as well as a deterrence capacity.
Achieving a threshold status does not mean that Iran is poised to field nuclear armed aircraft or missiles. Staying at the threshold may suit Teheran’s purposes for now and fulfils many of Teheran’s goals in the region.
The legitimacy of demands will only be perceived as legitimate if other states which violate norms of international law are required to comply. Other non-nuclear weapons states like Japan and Brazil, which are parties to the NPT, legally maintain a partial or full fuel cycle under the NPT.
It remains doubtful whether the demands can be regarded as legitimate against the background of the Indian-US deal on nuclear cooperation and the EU’s tolerance of nuclear activities by Japan and Brazil. Furthermore, it is hard to see any other regime, be it moderate as it will, foreclosing the nuclear option. At the end of the day we might have to be prepared to live with an Iran that possesses a nuclear capability.
The European Union must tread carefully as there is the danger in turning up the temperature with sabre-rattling and further punitive sanctions. We have to admit that punitive measures produced only Iranian pain without compromise. Even the widest and most powerful array of economic sanctions has failed to produce results. Coercive diplomacy has a better chance to succeed if it is combined with positive inducements and they are spelled out clearly and not formulated vaguely.
The hot rhetoric and sabre-rattling reminds us of Iraq, which is still very fresh in the memory of the international community. Then the United States talked about weapons that did not exist. In fact they were chasing the wind. Today, they are talking about Iran’s intentions that may not exist.
Then as today we still lack the main ingredient: Evidence.
Europe should avoid being dragged into an adventure that has all the ingredients of a catastrophe. It would take Europe decades to recover from such a catastrophe.
The EU must find openings that can create diplomatic opportunities to engage Iran on the international stage that would reduce Iran’s risk taking and make us all feel more secure.
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Tags: foreign policy, iran, News, nuclear weapons, Politics, the eu
best and fair artical i have seen up to date wise advice
Can’t believe it. A guy with the name “Israel” writes a balanced article!
You are 100% correct Israel, Europe/’the west’ needs to rethink the bargaining point here and read the Iranian cards a little better.
If Western negotiators allow themselves the luxury to think for even a moment that a war with Iran would be just like the Iraq war then they will be negotiating from a naive corner where risk is underestimated and said risk has far more dangerous consequences.
“Then as today we still lack the main ingredient: Evidence.”……the question is, even without evidence there is nothing that the population can do to stop any move against Iran short of civil disobedience which the government will not tolerate.
The protests in London did NOTHING prior the invasion of lraq to deter the then government’s decision to invade and I doubt this government will act any differently.
Whoever has nuclear bomb is very unlikely to use even against those who do not have that to retaliate with. Biological warfare would be easier and more deadly.
Fair point, but I think that hypothetically for the sake of debate, if Iran was attacked with biological or chemical agents then their response would not necessarily be the same in weapon choice but would most certainly be proportionate in response.